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Signaling devices for the supply of semi-public goods 
Abstract. 
This paper deals with the concept of a semi-public good. These semi-public goods 
are characterized by the fact that their use is being supplemented by specific private 
goods. The consumption of this complementary private good is constrained by an 
individual quantity constraint for each individual agent. The quantity constraints 
depend on the level of the semi-public good. For instance, car driving is limited by 
the level of the road system. This approach allows us to design economie institutions 
which carry out price discrimination among users of a semi-public good. People who 
are seriously hampered by too small a provision of a public good, because it 
constrains their use of the private commodity, are willing to pay a mark-up on the 
price for the latter one if this mark-up is spent for expanding the provision of the 
public good. In the model the availability of a public good is planned and organized 
by a central planner. The consumer's willingness to pay an individual mark-up on 
the price of a private commodity reflects his preferences for the availibility of the 
public good. These mark-ups are collected by the private goods industry and 
transferred to the central planner in order to cover the costs of the public good 
infrastructure. This framework of a private industry and a central planner providing 
semi-public goods is called an industrial economy. The main issue of this paper is to 
prove the existence of an equilibrium in such an economy 
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1. Introduction. 
The fundamental problem associated with pure public goods is the revelation of 
preferences. In real life this problem is ususally solved by political mechanisms, 
economie mechanisms being too cumbersome or impractical. Only the financing of 
public goods remained an economie problem. The theory of public finance has 
therefore been preoccupied with extracting money from the market economy to 
supply the government with sufficiënt funds. 
In this paper we propose a different approach. it is our purpose to bring the 
optimal provision and financing of a catagory of public goods into the domain of 
economics. We have succeeded only for a special type of public goods, which we call 
semi-public goods. These semi-public goods are characterized by the fact that their 
use is being supplemented byspecific private goods. Examples are: roads and cars; 
pollution and polluters; infrastructure and users; hospitals and medical services by 
doctors; quality and products; information and information carriers. In short, we 
relate infrastructural commodities with final goods that are based on this 
infrastructure. 
The idea is that people may be constrained in their individual use of a 
supplementary good, caused by a shortage of the related semi-public good. People do 
not need to realize that the cause of the shortage is to be found in the semi-public 
good: they are prepared to pay higher prices for the supplementary private 
commodity. This willingness-to-pay is seen as a signal given by the consumers 
indicating the scarcity of the underlying semi-public good. 
We assume that the industry is able to observe these signals and to discern 
groups of consumers giving different signals. Some people are more eager to be 
served than other people, are protesting louder and are willing to py a higher price 
for the private good if it is being served to them. These supplementary goods are 
signalling devices for the supply of semi-public goods. If this is the case, we show 
that: 
- the social benefits of the semi-public good for the use of some supplementary 
private goods can be determined. 
- efficiënt prices can be derived, which allow for decentralization of consumption 
and production decisions to a market. 
- the semi-public good is approximately budget-neutrally financed by the market. 
- the optimal supply of the semi-public good can be computed. 
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This paper is a contribution to the microeconomic public regulation of 
behavior, substituting political or juridicial measures into economie devices. It 
enables us to organize an economy with local public goods consistent with a global 
market. 
The main field of application will be the organization of an industry. In the 
sequel we will use public transportation as an example, although other complex goods 
such as a clean environment, health care or education might also be taken. The 
theory is relevant for both non-profit institutions and profit maximizing firms that 
are faced with the problem of finding performance criteria, which are faced with a 
shift from input-financing to output-financing. In order to judge both the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of production, they are forced to develop output 
criteria. These may be complementary private goods. 
We use the concept of a semi-public good, introduced by Ruys [5], see also 
Ruys and van der Laan (6) with a slight adaption of the formal definition. Here, a 
semi-public good is defined as a public good having a complementary private 
commodity. For each agent i, the amount y1 of his consumption of the private 
commodity and the amount z of availability of the public good are related to each 
other by an individual inequality constraint y ^ H z ) for each agent i. This constraint 
might be implicitly expressed in the consumer's utility function or the producer's 
production function. But the explicit formulation makes it possible to distinguish 
between whether an individual constraint is binding or not. If for some agent, say 
consumer i, the constraint is binding, then an increase of z has a direct effect on his 
demand because of the fact that z appears in the consumer's utility function, but also 
it has an indirect effect through the weakening of the constraint. The price for 
raising z offered by a truth-telling consumer will reflect the impact of both effects 
on his utility. The part reflecting the constraint will show up as a mark-up on the 
market price the consumer is willing to pay for the private commodity. If no agent 
in the economy feels himself constrained in the complementary commodity, the 
semi-public good reduces to a pure public public good with, if desired, Lindahl 
prices. In general, the definition of a semi-public good is relevant only if the 
constraints are binding for a considerable number of agents. 
The main advantage of this approach is that economie institutions can be 
designed which make price discrimination possible among users of a semi-public 
good. People who are seriously hampered by too small a provision of a public good, 
because it constrains their use of the private commodity, are thought of forming 
(political) pressure groups to expand its provision, or are informing the industry 
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otherwise. They are also willing to pay a mark-up on the price of the private 
commodity. In this way the private commodity is a signalling device for the semi-
public good. 
We will explore a model in which there is just one industry producing the 
complementary private commodity to a public good. The infrastructure of this public 
good is planned and organized by a central planner. The consumer's willingness to 
pay an individual mark-up on the price of the private commodity reflects his 
preferences for the infrastructure of the public good. This mark-up is collected by 
the private goods industry and transferred to the central planner in order to cover 
the costs of the public good infrastructure. As an alternative the private goods 
industry may levy a uniform mark-up on the prices of the private commodities to 
provide an infrastructure necessary for using their product. We call this framework 
of a central planner and private firms providing the complementary private good an 
industrial economy. 
It is evident that there are many spill-over effects resulting from any 
decision about the provision of a semi-public good. This calls for a general 
equilibrium approach, with an associated fixed point or zero point formulation. This 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the mathematical model is given. In that 
section we also state the first order conditions for a Pareto efficiënt allocation. The 
institutional framework to reach a Pareto efficiënt allocation is given in section 3. In 
section 4 we give the existence proof of an equilibrium in an industrial economy. 
Finally, in section 5 we make some remarks about the implementation and 
computation of an equilibium. 
2. The mathematical model. 
We consider a model of an industrial economy with one semi-public goods 
and one complementary private good. For example, the public good is a road system 
that is used by private cars, or a railway infrastructure that is used by train 
passengers. There is one other (composite) private commodity. A (possibly private) 
producer plans and organizes the level of the infrastructure of the semi-public good, 
taking into account the wishes of the (transportation) industry. 
Let there be h consumers, indexed by i=l,...,h. Each consumer i has a utility 
function «1(xl.y1>z) on X^R.%, where x1 is the consumption of the composite private 
commodity, y1 the consumption of the complementary private good and z the amount 
of the semi-public good. Consumer i has an initial endowment w1 of the composite 
private good. Furthermore, each consumer i faces an individual quantity constraint 
on the consumption of the complementary private good. That means, for instance, 
each consumer is constrained in his' or her's car driving because of the limitations of 
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the road system. So, we assume that there exist nonnegative increasing constraint 
functions y1 for i=l,...,h, such that given z the consumption y1 of consumer i is 
restricted by 
y1 < Az). (2.1) 
The industry is aware of these (subjective) constraints because it observes 
rationing in the demand functions. We assume that there is only one firm producing 
the complementary private good. The production function of the firm is given by 
F ^ x ^ y ^ < 0, (2.2) 
with x a < 0 the input of the composite private good and ya > 0 the output of the 
complementary commodity. 
The enterprise producing the (public) infrastructure is characterized by the 
production function 
Fb(xb ,zb) < 0, (2.3) 
with x b < 0 the input of the composite private good and zb the output of the semi-
public good. There is an initial level z of the semi-public good. So, after 
production, the total level is z = zb + z with z b > 0. We define for all i, yHzb) - y 
Hz+zb) = y\z). 
We assume that this economy, denoted by E = {(ul,ylt) i=l,...,h, F a , F b , w, z 
} is regular, i.e., the utility and production functions and the constraint functions are 
continuously differentiable, the utility functions ul are monotonically increasing and 
strictly quasi-concave, the productions functions are strictly concave and satisfy 
Fa(0,0) = 0 and Fb(0,0) = 0, and w = (w1,...^11) and Z are strictly positive. 
We are now ready to give some definitions. 
Definition 2.1. An allocation e = {(x^y1), i=l,...,h, xa, ya, xb , zb} is in the set A of 
feasible allocations if the constraints (2.1)-(2.3) hold with in (2.1) z = 2 + zb , and if 
Ej x1 < Sj wJ+ xa + x b (2.4) 
Ei y» < ya. (2.5) 
Observe that this definition includes the subjective constraints (2.1) y1 < y 
Hz) = y\z^). The quantity constraints (2.4) and (2.5) state that total demand is less 
than or equal to total supply. 
Definition 2.2. A feasible allocation e is efficiënt if there is a social welfare function 
W(u^,...,un), strictly increasing in u1, i = l,...,h, such that e maximizes the social 
welfare over the set A of feasible allocations. 
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According to Definition 2.2 the necessary conditions for an allocation of a 
regular ecoiiomy to be efficiënt follow from the maximization problem, 
max W(ui(xi,yi,Z+zb), i = l,...,h), (2.6) 
such that, with the shadow prices of the constraints between brackets, 
i=l,...,h (c*1) y i _ y i ( z b) < o 
(Aa) F a (x a , y a ) < 0 
(Ab) F b ( x b , z b ) < 0 
(M1) Ej x* < Sj wi+ x a + x b 
(M2) Ej y1 < y a 
(M3) z b > 0. 
i = l,...,h (2.7) 
i = l,...,h (2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
Differentiating the corresponding Lagrange function gives with respect to the 
variable between brackets: 
(x1) (fiW/fiuiXfaVfcc1) - M1 = 05 
(yi) (5W/5u i)(5« i/^y i) - a1 - fi2 = 05 
(xa) -Aa SFa/Sxa + /z1 = 0 
(y a) -Aa SF*/6ya + \P- = 0 
(xb) -Ab 5Fb/6xb + /i1 = 0 
(zb) Ej (SW/SUÏXSUVSZ13) + Si
 a i 5ji/5zb 
-Ab 5Fb/5zb + M3 = 0. (2.12) 
with all shadow prices nonnegative. Let us consider now an efficiënt allocation. For 
simplicity we assume that all constraints hold with equality except possibly for some 
of the individual constraints y1 - y\J°) < 0, i=l,...,h, on the consumption of the 
complementary private good, or for the positive production constraint zb > 0. If y1 -
y\J°) < 0 then a1 = 0. Hence with the composite private commodity taken as the 
numeraire, we obtain from (2.7)-(2.10) that in this case the first order condition for 
an efficiënt consumption of the complementary private good of i becomes, 
SuVsy1 5Fa/5ya 
. = if y1 - yi(zb) < 0. 
6ui/Sxi SFa/Sxa 
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This equation implies that for consumer i this commodity is then a private good, i.e., 
the MRS is equal to the MRT between this good and the numeraire commodity. If 
a1 = 0 for all i, then no consumer feels himself constrained in the use of 
complementary private good and we obtain from (2.7), (2.11) and (2.12) that the first 
order condition for the public good becomes 
5«V«zb SFb/Szb 
Ei = if y1 - y\zb) < 0 for all i. 
8ii1/8x1 8Fb/8xh 
However, if a1>0 for some i, then consumer i is willing to pay a mark-up on the 
MRT of the complementary commodity in order to subsidize an expansion of the 
infrastructure. This is reflected in the derivitive of the Lagrange function with 
respect to y1 through the Lagrange multiplier a1. So, the first order conditions for 
the consumption of the complementary private good become, 
Sui/Sy'1 8Fa/8ya 
—. r > -L y1 - ^(Zb) < 0, i = l,...,h, (2.13) 
SuySx1 8Fa/8xa 
where a>b ± c<d means: a>b, c<d and (a-b)(c-d) = 0. 
The mark-ups for expanding the public good appear in the first order conditions for 
the public good. From (2.7)-(2.10) it follows that 
a1 Sui/Sy'1 SFa/Sya 
M1 Sui/8xi SFa/Sxa 
so that the first order condition for the production of the public goods follows from 
(2.7), (2.11) and (2.12) by substituting a*//*1 and becomes 
Siï/sJ0 SJ/Sy'1 SFa/Sya 5Fb/5zb M3 
EJ + Ei - Syi/Szh - - (2.14) 
SuVSx1 8ul/8xl SFa/8xa 8Fh/8xh Ml 
We see that the sum of the MRS plus the sum of the mark-ups of the consumers is 
equal to the MRT of the public good minus /^J/MI- If a ^ mark-ups are equal to zero, 
then the public good behaves as a pure public good. We have that ^3 > 0 if zb = 0 
and M3 = 0 if zb > 0, so that (2.14) becomes 
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5«V5zb SuVSy1 SFa/6y SFb/Szb 
z
b
 > O 1 E; + Si - SyVSzh < (2.15) 
Siï/Sx1 Sifi/Sx1 SFa/Sxa SFh/Sxh 
So, if the production is positive then the sum of the MRS plus the sum of the mark-
ups of the consumers is equal to the MRT of the public good. 
The main advantage of introducing semi-public goods in this way is that an 
industrial economy can discriminate between agents who are and who are not 
constrained by the infrastructure, because it can observe demand-behavior. This 
information can solve partially (and sometimes completely) the difficult problem of 
determining the individual contributions to the provision of a public good. 
3. The institutional framework. 
In this section we describe the institutional framework under which an 
industrial equilibrium can be formulated satisfying the first order conditions for 
efficiency. This institutional framework is the private ownership industrial economy. 
In the economy E there are two private good markets in operation: one for both the 
composite private good and the complementary private good. The demands and 
supplies on these markets depend on their prices, p x and p v respectively. We take 
the private commodity as the numeraire commodity and set its price p x equal to one. 
In an efficiënt allocation p y = (8Fa/6ya)/(8Fa/6xa), i.e., p y equals the MRT. For the 
third commodity, the semi-public good, the situation is more complicated. 
We assume that the industry is able to discriminate among consumers who are 
constrained in the use of the complementary private good and who are not. At some 
efficiënt allocation e, let, for i=l,...,h, 
Sui/Sy'1 8Fa/Sya 
t i ( e ) = _ = (Swi/syiy^i/sx1) - p y (3.1) 
8ul/8xl 6Fa/Sxa 
be the willingness of consumer i to pay for the weakening of the constraint y1^). 
Then t1(e)8y1/8z^> is his willingness to pay for the expansion of the infrastructure. If 
yi
 K y( z b) then the MRS of consumer i equals the MRT and hence tJ(e) = 0. Next, 
at some allocation e, let us denote the marginal rate of substitution of consumer i 
between the semi-public good and the composite good by pJ(e), i=l,...,h. The 
planner's task of finding the desired level of the infrastructure is to make available 
an amount z such that the sum of these MRS's plus the total willingness to pay 
(marginal social benefits of the public good) is equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation (marginal social cost), pz(e). 
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Planner's problem: Find z such that 
Si [pi(e) + ti(e)Syi/5zb] < pz(e) l z b > 0. (3.2) 
The price to be paid by the planner for each unit of the production of the public 
good, p z , equals the MRT. On the other hand, the revenues of the planner consist of 
the consumers' contributions p1 per unit of the produced public good, and the mark-
up t1 per unit of complementary private good. If the revenues are not enough to 
cover the marginal cost price for any zb > 0, then zb must be taken equal to zero. 
The planner's profit ifi is therefore equal to 
7T° = Si pizb + Si t V - p zzb . (3.3) 
Using (3.2) and with pJ(e) = p1, tJ(e) = t1 and pz(e) = p z , ir® becomes 
7T° = Si tiy1 - tizhSyi/Szh = Si t V ( l - eKzh)) (3.4) 
with ex(zb) = (Sy1/Sz^)z*3/y1 the consumer's i individual infrastructure elasticity of 
the demand for the complementary private good at the level z. So, the planner's 
profit equals zero if for all i, e1 = 1 or t1 = 0. If for all i, y(0) = 0 and y1 is a 
convex function, then e1 > 1 for all i and ifi is nonpositive. On the other hand ifi is 
nonnegative if for all i, y\Q) > 0 and y1 is a concave function and hence e1 < 1 for 
all i. If for all i, yl(z^) = aJzb for some positive a \ then ifi = 0. 
To complete the description of the economy, we assume that the private 
firms are profit maximizing producers. We denote the respective profits by 7ra(pv) 
and 7rb(pz). All profits are distributed among the consumers including the planner's 
profit, with, for i=l,...,h and r e {0,a,b,}, <j>1T the share of consumer i in the profit 
of firm (or planner) r. All shares are nonnegative and Sj <f>n=\ for all r. Recall that 
the price p x of the numeraire composite commodity is equal to one. So, at prices p y 
and p z , and given the planner's profit ir®, the budget of consumer i is given by 
Bi(p,7r°) = WJ + ^i07T° + ^ ia7Ta(py) + ^ i b7Tb(pz). 
We are now able to define an industrial eauilibrium for the economy E. 
Definition 3.1. An industrial equilibrium for the economy E is an allocation e = {(x1, 
y1), i=l,...,h, xa, ya, xb , zb), prices p y > 0 and p z > 0 for the complementary private 
commodity and the public good, individual public good prices p1 > 0 and mark-ups t1 
> 0, i=l,...,h, and a planner's profit ir®, such that 
1) for all i, (x1,y1,zb) maximizes u^x'.y^Z+z^ under the budget constraint 
*i + (Py+t^y1 + pizb < BHp,^0); 
2) each producer maximizes profit subject to his technical constraint, i.e., 
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^ (py) = x a + pyy is the maximum of x a + p y y a such that Fa(xa ,ya) < 0, 
7rb(pz) = x b + p z z b is the maximum of x b + p z z b such that Fb(xb ,zb) < 
0; 
3) for all i: t* > 0 ± y'1 < y\zh); 
4) Si x1 = Ej w*+ x a + x b 
Si y1 = ya; 
5) zb > 0 ± £j {p1 + t15>,1(zb)/5zb] < p z , i.é., the planner's constraint is satisfied, 
and 
7T° = Ei t V ( l - eKzh)). 
Observe that the planner's profit appears in the budget of the consumer and 
depends on the values of the consumer's decision. Therefore it is taken explicitly in 
the definition of an equilibrium. In an equilibrium the availability of the public good 
is completely determined by the planner. So, actually the consumers do not maximize 
their utility over z. Instead, the prices p1 are determined such that for all i, zb is 
optimal under p1. The same reasoning holds for the public good's producer, who 
determines p z given the amount zb. The third condition has analogies in fixed price 
theory, from which it is well-known that quantity-constrained allocations can be 
sustained by virtual prices (see e.g. Neary and Roberts [4]). Here condition 3) says 
that a consumer is not willing to pay a mark-up on the cost price of a commodity if 
he or she is not constrained in the use of that commodity. 
Proposition 3.2. An industrial equilibrium allocation satisfies the first order 
conditions for Pareto efficiency. 
Proof. First, from 3), 4) and the technical constraints in the profit maximization 
conditions it follows that the allocation satisfies (2.1) - (2.5) and hence the allocation 
is feasible. Secondly, it follows from the utility maximization in 1), the maximization 
of 7ra in 2) and the complementarity condition 3) that condition (2.13) of Pareto 
optimality is satisfied, while condition (2.15) follows from the utility maximization, 
the maximization of 7ra and 7rb, and from the planner condition 5). 
So, taking the second order conditions for granted we have that an industrial 
equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. 
4. Existence of an industrial equilibrium. 
In this section we give a formal proof of the existence of an industrial 
equilibrium. This proof is not based on the implementation of the institutional 
10 
framework of an industrial economy. We will address the latter problem in the next 
section. 
To prove the existence, we define positive integers A, B and C such that A > 
Ej w'1, B > max{y|Fa(xa,ya) < 0 and -x a < A} and C > Z + max{z|Fb(xb,zb) < 0 and -
x
b
 < A}. So, A is greater than the total initial endowment and B and C exceed the 
maximal production of the private good and the public good. 
We assume that the economy E is regular. Furthermore, we make the 
following assumptions. 
Assumption 4.1. (SFa/5ya)/(SFa/6xa) is bounded for all finite x a and 
(SFb/Szb)/(SFb/Sxb) is bounded for all finite xb . 
Assumption 4.2. For all i, the constraint function y1 is continuously differentiable, 
e\0) = limzb^o (5y i/5zb)zb/y i exists, and e\zh) = (5//5zb)zb /y i(zb) is at least one 
at any zb > 0. 
Assumption 4.3. For all i: 
1) y\l) > 0, 
2) (5w1/^y1)/(5u1/5x1) is decreasing in y1 and increasing in x1, 
3) (5u1/8z)/(8u1/8x1) is decreasing in z and increasing in x1. 
Asumption 4.1 only says that the marginal rate of transformation is bounded. This 
guarantees that the input goes to infinity if the price ratio goes to infinity. 
Assumption 4.2 on the constraint function guarantees that the planner's profit is 
nonnegative at any solution zb of the level of the infrastructure. The nonnegativity 
of this profit guarantees positive incomes for the individuals, which is needed to 
prove existence. However, profits may even be negative, as long as the planner's 
deficit is small compared to the initial endowments and hence the individual incomes 
remain positive. The first part of Assumption 4.3 is a technical assumption saying 
that the current level Z allows for a positive use. The other parts say the marginal 
utility is decreasing. 
Suppose that {(x1, y1), i=l,...,h, xa, ya, xb , zb} is an industrial equilibrium 
allocation with p x = 1, p v , p z , p1, i = l,...,h and t \ i=l,...,h, the corresponding prices 
and mark-ups, and with 7r" the corresponding planner's profit. The budget 
restriction of consumer i is homogenous of degree zero in the prices, the mark-up t1 
and the profits. Moreover the producers' profits are homogeneous of degree one in 
the prices and the producers' decisions homogeneous of degree zero. Finally, both 
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equations in equilibrium condition 5) are homogeneous of degree one in prices, 
mark-ups and the planner's profit. Hence if the allocation {(x1, y1), i=l,...,h, x a , ya , 
x
b
, z
b} is an industrial equilibrium allocation supported by p x = 1, Py, p z , p1 and t*, 
i=l,...,h, and ir®, then it is also supported by p x = A, Apy, Apz, Ap1 and At1, i=l,...,h, 
and \n® for any A > 0. So, we can restrict the vector of prices p = (px , py, pz) in 
the nonnegative orthant of the 3-dimensional Euclidean space to the set of vectors in 
the 2-dimensional unit simplex 
S2 = {p G R3 | E k P k = 1}. 
Now, let q G R.2h+3 b e a vector (px , p y , p z , pl,...,ph, t1,...,t '1)T of prices and mark-
ups with with (px , p y , pz) E S2, i.e., q G S2 x R 2 h . Let (xa(q), ya(q)) be the 
solution to 
maximize p xx a + Pyya such that Fa(xa ,ya) < 0 and -x a < A, 
and let 7ra(q) be the corresponding profit pxxa(q) + pyya(q). 
Analogously, let (xb(q), zb(q)) be the solution to 
maximize P xx b + p zz b such that Fb(xb ,zb) < 0 and -x b < A, 
and let 7rb(q) be the corresponding profit pxxb(q) + pzzb(q). 
Furthermore, let 7r°(q) = Dj ty(zb(q))(l - e^q)), with e^q) = 
(5>,1(zb(q))/5zb)zb(q)/j'1(z(q)). Under Assumption 4.2, 7r^(q) is nonnegative and under 
the regularity assumption also the profits jra(q) and 7rb(q) are nonnegative. 
Moreover, under the regularity assumption the profit maximization problems have 
unique solutions being continuous in q if p x > 0, and hence all profits are continuous 
in q if p x > 0. Now, let (xJ(q), yJ(q), z*(q)) be the solution to 
maximize u^x^y^z1) under the budget constraint 
pxxi + (Py+t^yi + p V - Z ) < Bi(q), 
with B*(q) = Pxw i + ^i(V°(q) + ^ia?ra(q) + ^ib5rb(q), 
and under the constraints x1 < A, y1 < B and z1 < C. Since w1 > 0 and all profits are 
nonnegative, consumer i has a positive income for all q with p x > 0. Since all 
profits are continuous in q if p x > 0, B^q) is a continuous correspondence at all q 
with Px > 0 (Debreu [1]. From Assumption 4.1 it follows that there exists an La such 
that xa(q) = -A for p y / p x > La . Analogously, there exists an L b such that xb(q) = -A 
for p z / p x > Lb . Since q G S2 x R 2 n and hence p x + Py + Pz = 1, there exists an v > 
0, such that p y / p x > La or p z / p x > L b if p x < v. So, the demand for the composite 
private good exceeds the total initial endowment for p x < v. Therefore we restrict 
the vectors q to the set S2, x R 2 n with S2, = {p G K\ | p x + p y + p z = 1 and p x > 
v). Then B*(q) is a continuous correspondence at all q G S2, x R2^ and hence 
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under the regularity assumption the utility maximization problem has a unique 
solution (x1(q), y*(q), z*(q)) being continuous in q. Moreover the budget constraint is 
satisfied with equality because of the monotonicity of the utility functions if at least 
one of the quantity constraints x1 < A, y1 < B and z1 < C is not binding. Observe that 
yi = B if py+t1 = 0, and z* = C if p* = 0. 
Next we define: 
fx(q) = Ei xi(q) - ^ w* - x*(q) - x\q), 
fy(q) = Sj yi(q) - y*(q) 
fz(Q) - Si {p* + tV(zb(q)) /Szb] - p z , 
fi(q) = zi(q) -
 Zb(q) - z, i = l,...,h, 
rkd) = yHq) - Azb(Q)), i = l,...,h. 
We now define the function £ S2, x R 2 h -* R 2 h + 3 , by £(q) = [fx(q), fy(q), 
fz(q), f ^ q ) , . . . ^ ^ ) , r1(q),...,rn(q)JT. We will prove that a point q such that £(q ) < 
0 yields an equilibrium and that such a point q exists. 
From Assumption 4.3 it follows that there exists positive numbers M1 and T1 
such that zJ(q) < Z if p* > M1 and y*(q) < y*(Z) if t* > T\ i = l,...,h. We therefore 
restrict the domain of the function f to the compact set Sp x R2n(M,T), with 
R2h(M,T) = {pl,...,ph, tl,...,th | 0 < p1 < M \ 0 < t1 < T1, i = l,...,h}. We now apply the 
following well-known lemma. 
Lemma 4.4. Let f be a continuous function from a compact set S in R* to R*. Then 
there exists a point q e RK, such that qTf(q ) < q Tf(q ) for all q e S. 
We call q a stationary point of f on S. 
Lemma 4.5. Let q be a stationary point of f on S2, x R2n(M,T). Then £(q ) < 0. 
Proof. Let 
L(q) = pxfx(q) + Pyfy(q) + zb(q)fz(q) + Sj p¥(q) + ^ M q ) . 
From the definition of fx(q), fy(q), z(q), fz(q), f*(q) and r^q), i = l,...,h, 7ra(q), 
7rb(q), 7i-0(q) and the budget constraints it follows that L(q) < 0 for all q and L(q) = 
0 if for all i the budget constraints are satisfied with equality. Now, let q = (px , 
Py , Pz ' P1 >—'P*1 > l ' >—>t'1 >)T De a stationary point. From qTf(q ) < q Tf(q ) for 
all q e S2, x R2h(M,T) it follows that fJ(q*) < 0 if p1* = 0, £\q*) = 0 if 0 < pJ* < 
M1 and fi(q*) > 0 if p»* = MK If p1 = M1 then zJ(q) < Z and hence fJ(q) < 0, so that 
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at a stationary point p1 > 0 i f*(q ) < 0 for all i. Analogously we have that t1 > 0 ± 
r\q*) < 0 for all i. From this it also follows that pi*fi(q*) = 0 and t^r^q*) = 0 for 
all i and hence 
px*fx(q*) + py*fy(q*) + zb(q*)fz(q*) < 0 (4.1) 
* # # 
while p x + Py + p z = 1 . Moreover the stationary point definition implies that for 
all (p x , p y , p z , ) T e S2,, 
sfc sfc J . * A J» »^ ik & 
PxfxCQ ) + Pyfy(q ) + Pzfz(Q ) ^ Px fx(Q ) + Py fy(Q ) + Pz fz(Q ) (4-2) 
From this we obtain that also fx(q ) < 0, fy(q ) < 0 and fz(q ) < 0 as follows. 
From (4.2) it follows that fx(q ) = fy(q ) = fz(q ) if (px , p y , p z ) T e int S^, i.e, 
if p x > v, py > 0 and p z > 0. Hence, it follows with (4.1) that fx(q ) = fy(q ) = 
fz(q*) ^ 0 if (px*, py*, p z*)T e int S$. 
jfc ^ ^ sic :fc % 
Now, suppose p x = v. Then (4.2) implies that fx(q ) < min {fy(q ), fz(q )} 
if both Py > 0 and p z > 0, fx(q ) < fy(q ) if p z = 0 and fx(q ) < fz(q ) if p y = 0. 
Together with (4.1) this implies that fx(q ) < 0. However fx(q) > 0 if p x = v and 
hence p x > v. It remains to consider three cases: 
if. if. if if if 
Case 1) Py = 0 and p z > 0. Then (4.2) implies that fx(q ) = fz(q ) and fy(q ) < min 
{fx(q ), fz(q )}. Together with (4.1) it follows that fx(q ) = fz(q ) < 0 and hence 
fy(q*) < 0. 
Case 2) Py > 0 and p z = 0. Observe that zD(q) = 0 if p z = 0. Then, analogously to 
case 1) it follows that fz(q ) < fx(q ) = fy(q ) < 0. 
Case 3) py = 0 and p z = 0. It follows from (4.1) that fx(q ) < 0, while (4.2) implies 
that fy(q*) < fx(q*) < 0 and fz(q*) < fx(q*) < 0. 
This proves that f(q ) < 0. 
Theorem 4.6. If E is regular and under the Assumptions 4.1 - 4.3, there exists an 
industrial equilibrium. 
Proof. Under the regularity condition we have that fx, fy, fz, f1,...,^, r1 , . . . ,^, are 
continuous functions from Sjj x R2n(M,T) to R. Hence £ is continuous and 
according to Lemma 4.4 has a stationary point q . According to lemma 4.5 we have 
that £(q*) < 0. 
It remains to prove that q = (px , p y , p z , p1 ,...,ph , t1 ,...,th ) T yields an 
equilibrium. Firstly, from the fact that £(q ) < 0, it follows that q the quantity 
constraints x1 < A, y1 < B and z1 < C are not binding. Hence, for all i, xJ(q ), y'(q ), 
z*(q ) maximizes i-th utility under the budget restiction 
Px**1 + ( P y V ^ y 1 + piV-Z) < BHq*), 
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while this restriction is satisfied with equality. The latter implies that L(q ) = 0. 
Since for all i, p1* > 0 ± fi(q*) < 0 and t1* > 0 ± r\q*) < 0 this implies that px*fx(q*) 
+ p y fy(q ) + zb(q )fz(q ) = 0 and hence it follows that fx(q ) = 0, p y > 0 ± fy(q ) 
< 0 and p z* > 0 ± fz(q*) < 0. 
Now, let i be fixed for the moment. Suppose p1 = 0. From the monotonicity of the 
preferences we then have that z*(q ) = C. This contradicts z*(q ) < C and hence we 
have that p1 > 0. From this it follows that f*(q ) = z*(q ) - zb(q ) - Z = 0 and 
therfore z*(q ) = zD(q ) + Z . So, for all i, x*(q ), y*(q ), zD(q ) + z maximizes 
u1(x1, y1, z1) under the budget restriction 
Px**1 + (Py*+ti*)yi + p i V - Z ) < Bi(q*), 
" ak • 3fc t _ jfc 
and hence xJ(q ), y*(q ), zD(q ) satisfy equilibrium condition 1). 
From fx(q ) = Sj \\q ) - Sj w* - xa(q ) - xb(q ) = 0 we have that the market of the 
private composite commodity is in equilibrium and hence x*(q ), i = l,...,h, xa(q ), 
x
b(q ) satisfy the first equation of equilibrium condition 4). From this it also follows 
that -xa(q ) < A and -x°(q ) < A and hence the producers maximize their profits 
under the technical constraints only, implying that {xa(q ), y(q )} and {xb(q ), z(q )} 
satisfy the profit maximization condition 2). Since ya(q) = 0 if Py = 0 it follows that 
fy(q) = Ej yJ(q) - ya(q) > 0 if p y = 0 and hence we have that fy(q ) = E| yJ(q ) -
ya(q ) = 0, so that also the second equation 2 of equilibrium condition 4) is satisfied. 
From fz(q) - Ei {pi + tky^^/Sz^ - p z , we obtain that fz(q) > 0 if p z = 0 and 
hence fz(q*) = 0, implying that E} {pi* + ti*5)>i/Szb(q*)] = pz*, so that p1*, t**, i = 
l,...,h, p z and zD(q ) satisfy the first part of condition 5). From t1 > 0 ± r!(q ) < 0 
it follows immediately that for all i, y1(q ), y!(zb(q )) and t1 satisfy equilibrium 
condition 3). 
From this latter condition it follows immediately that t1 yJ(q ) = t1 y\zn{q )). Hence, 
5r°(q*) = E, ti*yi(zb(q*))(l - e\q)) = Ej ti*yi(q*)(l - e\q*)). So, also the second 
part of condition 5) is satisfied. Hence, q = (px , p y , p z , p1 ,...,ph , t1 ,...,tn ) 
and the corresponding x*(q ), yJ(Q )•> i=l,...,h, xa(q ), ya(q ), xb(q ), zb(q ) and 
•x®(q ) satisfy all equilibrium conditions. Because of the homogeneity of degree zero 
in q and since p x > 0, we obtain an equilibrium with p x = 1 by dividing all 
components of q by p x . This proves the existence of an equilibrium. 
Oberve that under the assumptions we have proved that in an equilibrium the 
producer price p z equals the total consumers' contributions p1 per unit of the 
produced public good plus the mark-ups t1 per unit of complementary private good. 
This does not imply that zb > 0. If the revenues are not enough to cover the 
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marginal cost price for any extension z° of the public infrastructure, zD should be 
equal to zero. 
5. Implementation and computation. 
In order to calculate a point q , such that £(q ) < 0, we can use for instance 
simplicial algorithms. Such algorithms first have been designed by Scarf and Kuhn 
for fixed point problems on the unit price simplex. Van der Laan and Talman [3] 
developed a variable dimension algorithm for problems on the unit simplex. Similar 
algorithms for fixed or zero point problems on R n have been introduced by van der 
Laan and Talman, Wright, Kojima and Yamamoto, and others. Furthermore these 
algorithms can be adapted for problems on the product space of a unit simplex and 
the n-dimensional Euclidean space (see e.g. Hofkes [2]). The latter algonthms can be 
applied to find a stationary point q of f. However, applying such an algorithm on 
S2 x R2.11 we have to solve a (2h+2)-dimensional problem. This will take a lot of 
computer time. However, under some simplifying assumptions we may reduce the 
problem of finding an equilibrium to a one-dimensional problem, highlightening the 
central issue of this paper. 
First, we assume, without loss of the generality of our approach, that the 
public good does not appear in the utility function of the consumers, i.e., pz1=0 for 
all i. In this case the consumers are only interested in the infrastructure if they are 
constrained. Now, the planner's problem becomes: find z such that 
z
b
 > 0 JL Ej t V / f ö b ] < p z . (5.1) 
For the firms we take constant returns to scale production functions, i.e., 
Fa(xa ,ya) = aya + xa and Fb(xb ,zb) = bzb + x b for some a > 0 and b > 0. From this 
we obtain immediately that in equilibrium 
ya > 0 JL p y < a and zb > 0 ± p z < b 
and 
^a
 = „-b = o. 
Furthermore, the assumptions Z > 0 and y^z) > 0 have only been made for 
technical reasons to prove existence. Here we assume Z = 0 and y\z") = a'z", so 
that y\z) = y\0) = 0 and Sy1/6z^> = a1. This implies that the planner's porfit is equal 
to zero, and hence the consumer i-th's income is equal to the values of his initial 
endowmwnt w1. For the consumers we take Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Recall 
that we assume that the public good does not appear in these functions. So, for 
i=l,...,h, the utility of consumer i is given by 
"'(x'.y1) = Pi'ln x1 + P21ln y1, 
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where p\1+P21 is normalized to one. Maximizing utility of consumer i under the 
budget constraint with p x = 1 
x
1
 + (Py+t^y1 = w1 
gives for the consumer's demand 
x
1
 = pjiw1 (5.2) 
y i « P 2 iwi/(py + t i) (5.3) 
For given z and demand y1, the mark-up t1 is determined by the firm Fa by setting 
t1 = max{0, {P2l^/^lzh) - py}. (5.4) 
So, the mark-ups are determined by the industry such that the individual demands 
do not exceed the individual constraints a1z^1. From (5.3) and (5.4) we obtain that 
y i = p2iwi/py and i1 = 0 if P2 iw i/py < a*zb (5.5) 
and 
y1 = axz and t1 = p21w1/a1zb - p y if P2*wVpy > aJz^. (5.6) 
Observe that the discrimination among consumers is determined by the parameters 
P21, w1 and a1. In fact, the willingness to pay increases with P2l and w1 and 
decreases with a1. 
The production level ya is set by the producer to equal total demand, i.e., 
ya = Sj yi. (5.7) 
Consequently, given the infrastructure level zb , and assuming positive production so 
that Py = a and p z = b, the values of all other variables, namely quantities and 
mark-ups, can be calculated through (5.1)-(5.7). So, the equilibrium problem is to 
find a level z of the infrastructure such that the markets for the composite 
commodity clears and the mark-up revenues are equal to the costs of the 
infrastructure, i.e., 
E| x1 = Si w1 + xa + xP (market condition) 
2i a1!1 = p z = b (planner condition). 
Since the budget conditions are satisfied with equality it follows that the market 
condition holds if the plannner condition is satisfied. So, substituting (5.4) in the 
planner condition we find an equilibrium by solving the equation 
Si aimaxtO, (p2 iw i/a izb) - py} = b 
in the variable J°. 
This highlights the issue of the paper. The problem of the optimal level of the 
infrastrucuture can be solved by the planner (or industry) if the industry is able to 
calculate the mark-ups on the use of the complementary private good. 
This paper has been concerned with the problem of financing an 
infrastructure needed for operating and utilizing private services and commodities. 
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The paper has to be seen as a first attempt to give a solid framework for the idea 
that the industry plays a central role in financing the infrastructure. In fact, the 
infrastructure is financed through mark-ups on the private services and commodities 
that make use of it. These mark-ups come from the constraints experienced by the 
agents. With respect to the consumers, the level of the infrastructure yields a 
(subjective) constraint on their private consumption. In case of producers the level of 
the infrastructure puts a constraint on their production possibilities. The mark-ups 
reveal these constraints and therefore the need for the infrastructure. Given the 
mark-ups the agents are willing to pay, the planner determines the optimal level of 
the infrastructure. In a next paper we want to consider the problem of determining 
the mark-ups. We want to elaborate the idea that the individual mark-ups are 
determined by the industry and are corporated in the prices the producers set for 
their products. We may think of a partitioning of the consumers into a number of 
groups. Then for each group the industry sets the mark-ups by considering a 
representative agent. So, in this way we get different prices for different types of 
agents. 
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